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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

action

was

commenced

defendants on March 26, 1974.
either

stockholders

of

the

by

the

plaintiffs

(R.5-16).
defendant,

against

the

The plaintiffs were
Shelley

Irrigation

Development Corporation or were investors in said corporation.
(Complaint, para. 1 & 2, R.6).

Based upon the conduct of the

defendants, the plaintiff sought an accounting of the corporate
funds, the appointment of a receiver, an injunction restraining
the transfer of corporate property and a redistribution of the
stock on a fair and equitable basis.
defendants

filed

an Answer

(R.5--16).

and Counterclaim

Thereafter, the

on September 11,

1974, alleging that the plaintiffs had unjustifiably interfered
in the business of the defendant and that the defendant corporation was thereby damaged.

(R.89-102).

The case was at issue for an extremely long period of time
and based upon the inactivity, Judge J. Robert Bullock, upon the
filing of a Motion to Dismiss by the plaintiffs, dismissed the
action with prejudice based upon Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

(R.351-352).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

The Complaint was filed on March 26, 19J34 on behalf of

the plaintiffs

requesting

that the court

impose

an

immediate

receivership, require the defendants to maike an accounting of
the monies invested by the plaintiff and further, to reapportion
the stock based upon the inequities between the plaintiffs and
the defendants.
2.

(R.5-16).

Based upon the pleadings showing that the defendant,

Shelley Irrigation Development, Inc. was facing imminent foreclosure by the Small Business Administration of the United States

2

Government and therefore, all of the assets of the corporation
and monies invested by the plaintiffs were in peril, the Court
ordered Sidney A. Gilbert as a receiver of all business property
of the defendants.

Under the terms of the Order, Mr. Gilbert was

allowed to take immediate possession of the business property and
manage the same and was further charged with the responsibility
of determining the status of the corporation.
3.

(R.16-20).

The Hearing on the Order to Show Cause and Restraining

Order which counsel for the plaintiff had signed by Judge Bullock
was continued to May 3, ^984,^by the defendants first counsel in
the case, John Pappas.
4.

(R.60-61).

One day prior to the hearing

of the Order to Show

Cause, the plaintiffs and the defendants acting through their
second attorney in the matter, A. M. Ferro, stipulated that the
Court could issue its Order confirming the appointment of the
receiver and that the receivership would
further Order of the Court.
5.

continue

subject to

(R.70-71).

After the Order memorializing the stipulation of the

7

parties was signed by Judge Bullock on May 17, 19^4, (R.73-75),
no further action was taken until July, 1974.
6.

On July 12, 1974, the defendants, through their third

set of attorneys, Orrin Hatch and Lowell Summerhays,
Motion to Dissolve the Receivership (R.76-80).

3

filed a

On July 26, 1974,

Judge

Maurice

defendants.
7.

Harding

dismissed

the

Motion

filed

by

the

(R.81).

On September 13, 1974, Orrin G. Hatch on behalf of the

defendants filed his second Motion to Dissolve the Receivership.
(R.82).

The plaintiffs in response prepared and had signed by

Judge Allen B. Sorensen an Order To Show Cause addressed to the
defendants requiring them to appear before the Court on September
18, 1984, and to show cause why all of the assets of the corporation should not be turned over to the appointed receiver, Sidney
Gilbert*
8.
attorney,

(R.84-88).
On September 11, 1974, the defendants, through their
Orrin

G.

Hatch,

filed

an Answer

and

Counterclaim.

(R.89-103).
9.

On September 18, 1984, the plaintiffs1 Order to Show

Cause requesting the Court to require the defendants to turn
over all of the assets of the corporation to the receiver and
the defendants1 Motion to Dissolve the Receivership came on for
hearing.
agreement

The parties were able to stipulate to the issues which
is

evidenced

stated to the Court
plaintiffs' counsel

by

a

transcript

(R. 109-117),
(R.119-121).

of

the

Stipulations

and by an Order* drafted by
Under the terms of *the Order

the receivership was dissolved and the defendants were allowed
two months beginning September 19, 1974, in which to attempt to
4

raise $350,000•

The $350,000 was contemplated to be enough money

to bring the Small Business Administration current, to pay off
all outstanding creditors that were in default and to pay off all
of the plaintiffs for money they had invested in the corporation.
The Order further provided that if the defendants were unable to
raise the money within two months, Mr. Sidney A. Gilbert would
be re-appointed as the receiver with full authority to conduct
the operations of the defendants' business.
10.

On June 18, 1975, a Motion and Order to Show Cause was

prepared by plaintiffs' counsel requesting the Court to find the
defendants in contempt of court inasmuch as they had failed to
abide by the terms of the previous Order dated September 18,
1974.
Show

Specifically, the Affidavit in support of the Order to
Cause

signed

defendants had

by Mr.

Sidney

Gilbert

indicated

that

the

failed to raise the necessary monies and that

they had failed to turn over any of the books or assets of the
corporation and finally alleged that the defendants were in the
process of taking the large equipment out of the State of Utah.
(R.126-129).
11.

The Order to Show Cause came on for hearing on August

1, 1975, and was continued to August

15, 1975

(R.151).

Order to Show Cause was continued

again to October

(R.152),

from

and

was

finally

stricken

5

the

The

10, 1975

calendar,

to be

called

up

on ten

(10) days written

notice by

either party.

(R.165).
12.

After the Order to Show Cause was stricken on October

10, 1975, no action was taken in the case as it related to the
plaintiffs and defendants until January 30, 1979.

At that time,

Dwight G. Flickinger became the defendants fourth counsel in the
case.

After the substitution took place on January 30, 1979, no

action was taken until March 13, 1979, at which time counsel for
the defendant, Mr. Flickinger,

filed a Request

Conference and Notice of Pre-Trial.
13.
J.

Robert

(R.169-173).

On March 19, 1979, the case came before the Honorable
Bullock

for Pre-Trial.

Pre-Trial, no trial date was set.
14.

for Pre-Trial

During

the

course

of the

(R.176).

On May 16, 1979, a Stipulation for Dismissal of the

Receivership was filed with the Court

(R.177-179).

signed by Judge Bullock based upon Stipulation

The Order

rescinded

the

confirmation and appointment of the receiver effective March 19,
1979, and reserved the exoneration of the receiver as an issue
in the case and further did not require the receiver to provide
an accounting unless requested by the receiver himself or any of
the other parties.

The last portion of the Order signed by

Judge Bullock then stated explicitly that the case was to be put
on the inactive calendar until further notice (R.179).

6

15.

No action was taken

from the

filing

of that

Order

until M. Dayle Jeffs, counsel for the plaintiff withdrew from the
case

on June

noticed

and

witness,
16•

18, 1984, inasmuch
it became

apparent

as his
that

deposition

he would

be

had

been

a material

(R.181-182).
Defendants, appearing through their fifth counsel of

record on June 20, 1984, noticed the depositions of eighteen
different

individuals

(R.184-187),

moved

for

a

trial

date

(R.203-205), and sent to the plaintiffs a set of interrogatories
containing two hundred separate interrogatories with sub-parts,
(R.212-280).
Request

for

Additionally,
Production

separate requests.
17.

of

defendants1
Documents,

counsel

consisting

of

sent

a

thirty

(R.282-287).

Judge J. Robert Bullock noticed the case for purpose

of scheduling on August 3, 1984.

The Court set the matter for a

Scheduling Conference on August 24, 1984.
18.

new

(R.295).

Plaintiffs, appearing through their counsel, Richard

B. Johnson, who took the place of M. Dayle Jeffs filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Counterclaim on the basis of Rule 41(b).
therewith was a supporting Memorandum (R.296-304).

Filed

Additionally,

plaintiffs moved the Court for a Protective Order to be relieved
of the burden of the Depositions, Interrogatories and Request of

7

Documents on the basis they were clearly burdensome and sent
with the intent to harass,
19.
1984,

(R.305-310).

When the matter came on for scheduling on August 24,

the

Court

determined

that

the

Motion

to

Dismiss

the

Counterclaim and also for Protective Order should be heard on an
evidentiary basis.

The Court ordered Mr. Summerhays to file a

Response to the Motions within the week and both sides were to
be prepared
1984.

for a factual hearing on Thursday,

September 20,

Defendants stipulated to a Protective Order as it related

to the Discovery.
20.

(R.332).

The matter, after extensive briefing by the plaintiffs,

came on for evidentiary hearing on September 20, 1984.

At that

time, M. Dayle Jeffs and Sidney Gilbert were sworn and testified.
The

defendants

rested.

called

Ned

R.

Shelley

and

then

both

parties

Based upon the evidence, the Court ruled that under

Rule 41(b), the action should be dismissed inasmuch as because
of the lapse of time, it would be unreasonably difficult, if not
impossible,

for the plaintiffs to respond to the Counterclaim

and prepare for trial because much of the evidence has been lost
and memories

have

obviously

been dimmed.

The Court

further

found that the defendants had not been diligent to the extent
required under all of the circumstances as shown by the record

8

and the evidence and finally, the Court found that the dismissal
of the Counterclaim would not be unjust,
21.

(R.346-347),

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment,

incorporating Judge Bullock's findings were prepared and signed
by Judge Bullock on November 19, 1984,
22.

Notice

of

December 19, 1984.

Appeal

was

(R.348-353),

filed

by

the

defendants

on

(R.356-357).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

23.

Plaintiffs

are

entitled

to

a

dismissal

of

the

defendants' Counterclaim under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure inasmuch as the defendants failed to prosecute
the case with diligence and failed to comply with the appropriate
rules of the District Court and Rules of Civil Procedure.
24.
bility

The case law interpreting Rule 41(b) and the responsiof

litigants,

fully

supports

Judge

Bullock's

Order

dismissing the case.
25.

The

fact that because

of the

large

amount

of time

passing between the crucial facts giving rise to this litigation
and

the

actual ^ time

when

the

defendants

pursued

their

Counterclaim, justify, in light of dim memories and lost records,
the dismissal of the action.

9

POINT I
THE RECORD AND EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE SUPPORT
DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION.
Judge Bullock, in his Ruling at Trial, (R.346-347), in the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment

(R.348-353)

make three findings upon which he based the dismissal of the
action.
would

be

The Court found that because of the lapse of time, it
unreasonably

difficult,

if not

impossible,

for the

plaintiffs to respond to the Counterclaim and prepare for trial
because much of the evidence had been lost and memories obviously
have been dimmed.

Secondly, the Court found that the defendants

have not been diligent to the extent required

under all the

circumstances as shown by the record and the evidence in moving
the case forward.

Thirdly, the Court found that under all of

the

the

circumstances

Court

believed

Counterclaim would not be unjust.

the

dismissal

of

the

All three aspects of that

Ruling are fully supported by the record.
A.

The Defendants Have Not Been Diligent To The
Extent Required Under All Of The Circumstances In Moving The Case Forward.

As indicated in the Statement of Facts, there was certainly
some activity in the case from the time the Complaint was filed
on March 26, 1974 to October 10, 1975.

It was on October 10,

1975, that the plaintiffs1 Order to Show Cause seeking to hold
the defendants

in contempt

of court
10

for

failing

to

transfer

assets to the receiver and otherwise abide by the Court's Order
was stricken,

(R.165).

The defendants took no action with regard to the prosecution
of the Counterclaim or for the advancement of the case generally
from October 10, 1975, until the defendants had retained Dwight
G. Flickinger as their attorney who entered an appearance on
January 22, 1979.

(R.167).

It took Mr. Flickinger from January

22, 1979 to March 9, 1979 to request a Pre-Trial Conference.
(R.171-172).

From the time Mr. Flickinger entered his appearance

in January to the time he requested a Pre-Trial, no discovery or
activity took place in the file.

It was only after the Notice

of Pre-Trial that one of the plaintiffs, Bryce W. Baker, had his
deposition taken.
As indicated

(R.174).
above, the Pre-Trial was held on March 19,

1979 (R.176) but the Stipulation dealing with how the case was
going to progress was not filed until May 16, 1979.

(R.177-179).

Page three of that Stipulation and Order recites in the paragraph
directly above Judge Bullock's signature the following:
It is further ordered placing this case on
the inactive calendar until further notice.
(R.179) - (See full body of the Stipulation and Order set out in
the Addendum.)
In 1983, the Judicial Counsel of the State of Utah adopted
amended Rules of Practice for the District Courts.
11

One of those

Rules

deals

specifically

with

the

timing

of

civil

cases

and

specifically the time that a litigant can take to get a matter
ready for trial.

Rule 4.1(h) of the Rules of Practice of the

District Courts, states as follows:
The Clerk of the Court shall place on the
inactive calendar every case in which a
Certification of Readiness for Trial has not
been served and filed within 270 days after
service of process thereof.
All
cases
remaining on the Inactive Calendar for two
months shall be dismissed without prejudice
for lack of prosecution and the Court shall
make an appropriate order as to any bond or
other security filed therein, unless prior
to the expiration of such two month period:
1) a proper Certification of Readiness
Trial is served and filed; or

for

2) the Court, on motion for good cause
shown, orders the case continued on the
Inactive Calendar for a specified period of
time without dismissal.
After the Court

signed the Order placing the case on the

Inactive Calendar, which Order is dated May 16, 1979, absolutely
no action was taken during the next two months and accordingly,
under Rule 4.1(h), the Court certainly had the power to dismiss
the action.
At the time
testified

from

of the evidentiary

first-hand

knowledge

hearing,
as

to

only

the

one

reason

witness
why

the

case was placed on the Inactive Calendar and the length of time

12

contemplated by the Court and counsel that it would take to get
the case to trial.
Mr. Jeffs testified that he, on behalf of the plaintiffs,
and

Mr.

Flickinger,

on

behalf

of

the

defendants,

discussed

specifically what was contemplated by the clause which placed
the case on the Inactive Calendar.

(T.14, R.380).

Mr. Jeffs

testified that those conversations took place shortly before the
preparation of the Stipulation and that the substance of the
conversation was as follows:
MR. JEFFS: It was conversation by telephone.
He called me from Phoenix, I believe; and
indicated
that he wanted
to get this
receivership out of the way.
We discussed
how the receivership came about; and that
after the receivership, after Mr. Gilbert
was appointed, that the defendants removed
all of the ditch lining; I forgot what their
name is, its an invention of Mr. Shelleys,
that they removed them all from the State of
Utah and from the jurisdiction of Mr.
Gilbert, and that the bank account had been
removed, and he had not way to reach beyond
state jurisdiction.
He indicated to me, Mr. Flickinger indicated
to me, that they had, I believe, already had
some hearings in Washington D.C. with SBA or
with the Senate Committees or something of
that nature; that they were in negotiations
with the SBA, he had requested a pre-trial
conference in March; and rather than setting
it on the trial calendar he suggested that
if we stipulated the termination of the
receivership
as not
having
any
useful
purpose at that time, even though it had
been stipulated to, that he would in a
matter of two, three, four months have his

13

matters far enough along with the SBA that
he would then gear it up and we would go
forward with the Trial.
(T.14-15, R.380-381).
When Mr. Jeffs was asked explicitly as to whether or not
there was any discussion that the case would even continue an
inactive status for even a year Mr. Jeffs stated:
Oh - No. He assured me that when he, he had
either investigated the case thoroughly and
that when he takes on a case when he said:
f
it f s going to move and its going to move
fast' he said: 'we'll be in trial within
less than a year.'
(T.15-16, R.381-382).
Mr. Flickinger, representing the defendants, thought that
during that three or four month period of time, that he would be
able to obtain
approximately

a reinstatement

of the SBA

loan and get the

$144,000 of money which had not been disbursed

under the original loan.

(T.48, R.414).

On cross-examination,

Mr. Jeffs was asked if at the end of the three or four month
period of time if he tried to make contact with Mr. Flickinger.
Mr. Jeffs indicated that he did not and when asked why not, Mr.
Jeffs testified as follows:
I received a call, and I don't know the time
frame, but I received a call from another
attorney that said he was going to be
representing the Shelleys.
(T.51, R.417).

14

Mr. Jeffs indicated that during that period of time, he had
at least four or five attorneys calling him at different times,
indicating that they were licensed to practice in both Arizona
and Utah, that they would be representing the Shelleys and the
Shelley Irrigation Company and that they would make an appearance
in the matter.

(T.ll, R.377).

Mr. Jeffs was asked on cross-examination explicitly whether
or not

any

replacing

of the reasons given to the Court

the

case

on

the

Inactive

Calendar

in

the

Federal

District

Court

litigation

defendants against other parties.
indicated

that

although the

or Mr. Jeffs

was

because

initiated

by

of
the

On each occasion, Mr. Jeffs

federal lawsuit was a peripheral

matter, that it did not play any part in the discussion relating
to placing the present case on the inactive calendar.

(T.47-50,

R.413-416).
From May 16, 1979, the date Judge Bullock signed the Order
placing the case on the Inactive Calendar, no action was taken
until
entered

Mr.
an

Summerhays,
appearance

present
and

Interrogatories, Requests

counsel

submitted

to

for
the

the

defendants,

plaintiffs

the

for Production of Documents and the

Notice of Depositions which were all filed approximately June
18, 1984.

Over five years had transpired with absolutely no

activity in an action which sought to litigate facts occurring

15

prior to 1974.
the

file

of

In review of the transcript of the hearing and
the

case,

there

is

little

question

that

the

defendants, while employing a large number of attorneys over a
ten year period, failed to take any kind of reasonable action in
prosecuting their case with diligence.
B.

The Long Lapse Of Time Would Make It
Impossible For The Plaintiffs To Respond And
Prepare For Trial On The Defendants' Counterclaim.

The Court in its Findings of Fact and Decision specifically
found that

evidence pertaining

to the defendants' claims had

been lost and that memories had been dimmed.

The Court concluded

it would be unreasonably difficult, if not impossible, for the
plaintiffs to respond to the claims contained in the Counterclaim.

(See Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Judgment

in the Addendum).
At the evidentiary hearing conducted on September 20, 1984,
several witnesses testified regarding the ability to prepare for
trial on the defendants' Counterclaim.
Mr. Jeffs, attorney for the plaintiffs, testified that he
had

involvement with the defendants, Ned

Irrigation,
testified

prior

that

to

there

the

initiation

were

a number

investments,

stock

purchases,

and

Valley Bank.

(T.5-6, R.371-372).
16

of

Shelley
the

and

Shelley

Complaint.

of meetings

negotiations

relating

with

SBA

He
to
and

Mr. Jeffs testified that there

were no notes that he was aware of that related to meetings with
the SBA and Valley Bank which it occurred, at the time of the
hearing, over eleven years ago.

(T.6, R.372).

Mr. Jeffs stated

consistently that it would be very difficult, if not impossible,
to remember the facts relative to the litigation and that his
ability to remember was impeded by the long delay in the matter.
(T.7, R.373).
Mr. Jeffs was asked questions relating to the books and
records available concerning the corporation from
present date.

1974 to the

Specifically, Mr. Jeffs was asked whether Mr.

Gilbert, the stipulated

receiver, ever received possession of

the assets of the business or of its records, from which some
documentation could be procured relating to the issues relevant
in the lawsuit.

Mr. Jeffs testified

that Mr. Gilbert never

received from the defendant Shelley, pursuant to the Stipulation
for Receivership, any assets.
obtained

from Mr. Shelley

The only thing the receiver ever

was

some

of the

records.

(T.19,

R.385) .
Mr. Jeffs was then asked whether or not he had an opinion as
to whether the presentation of the case would be prejudiced by
the time element.

Mr. Jeffs testified that it would be severely

prejudiced (T.20, R.386).
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Mr.

Jeffs

testified

that

after

being

contacted

by

the

defendants new counsel in March of 1984, Mr. Jeffs attempted to
contact

some of the

years before.

individuals whom he had

represented

ten

Mr. Jeffs stated that he could not locate all of

them and was able to meet with less than a third of those who
had originally been named as plaintiffs.

Mr. Jeffs testified

that some of the plaintiffs could not even remember that they
were in the lawsuit, some could not even remember any details
concerning the litigation, and as it related to the plaintiffs1
memories as to specific meetings, many had hardly any memory at
all of the critical dates.

Mr. Jeffs concluded by saying that

it was obvious that he had a better memory than the plaintiffs
about the specific meetings but he had many gaps in his own
recollection.

(T.19-21, R.385-387).

Mr. Jeffs was asked whether or not there were any tape
recordings of meetings.

Mr. Jeffs indicated that he had never

heard or listened to any tape recordings (T.55, R.421).
The plaintiffs called Mr. Sidney S. Gilbert who testified
he was

the

certified

twenty-eight years.

public

accountant

(T.62, R.428).

and

had

been

so

for

Mr. Gilbert testified that

he did not have any documents relating to the Shelley Irrigation
matter.

(T.62, R.428).

When asked about his appointment, the
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activities that he engaged in and the assets he took control of,
Mr. Gilbert testified as follows:
I was appointed by the Court. We eventually
were able to get entrance into the office
over in Lindon, and had access to that
building.
That was, those assets were the
only assets I had any connection with.
As far as the records were concerned, the
only records I worked with, as far as
receipts and disbursements, some checks were
brought in, I had made out checks for
payroll and, possibly, some expenses.
And
then, I believe Mrs. Shelley brought those
in, and then I would make out a payroll for
the people working on the machines and they
were paid and the monies were disbursed to
those people.
(T.62-63, R.428-429).
Mr. Gilbert indicated that he was involved in the business
for a couple of months and inasmuch as the equipment was located
out of the state he did not do anything after that time.

(T.63,

R. 429) .
When asked whether or not he had an opinion as to whether
his ability as a witness to comment upon what the receiver did
in interfering with the company is diminished by the passage of
time, Mr. Gilbert stated as follows:
Well, I have no records left of what I did
or what I didn't do; but, I didn't interfere
with the company, to my knowledge, and I
couldn't testify that I didn't.
(T.64, R. 430).
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Mr* Gilbert testified that his ability to comment on what
took place after his appointment was diminished by the passage
of

time

and

that

he

does

not

remember

conversations and contact that he had,

with

any

accuracy

Mr. Gilbert testified

that he had totally forgotten about the case and had wiped it
out his memory,

(T.64-65, R.430-431).
POINT II

UTAH LAW SUPPORTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION.
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in
pertinent pari: as follows:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of
the Court, defendant may move for dismissal
of an action of any claim against him . . . .
The Utah Supreme Court has examined the latitude a Trial
Court has under Rule 41(b) on several prior occasions.

In K. L.

C. Inc., v. McLean, 656 P.2d 986 (Utah, 1982), a factual situation was presented much like the facts in the present action.
The appeal was provoked by the granting of plaintiffs' Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute under Rule 41(b).

A lawsuit

was brought by a plaintiff corporation against the defendant who
was previously the secretary-treasurer of the corporation.

The

defendant had apparently written an $8,000 check from corporate
funds he allegedly has misappropriated.

The corporation voted

the defendant out of office and thereafter, Complaint was filed
20

against him to recover the amount of the check.

Subsequently,

the defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim,

The case was

set for trial on December 12, 1968.

Defendants' local counsel

withdrew in October, 1968, and new counsel appeared in November,
1968 and the trial was moved to March, 1969.

The trial was not

held on the date set and for six years the case remained dormant.
Suddenly, on November 26, 1975, a non-jury trial was set for
March 19, 1976.

That date was delayed for further discovery.

From that point in time, the case remained dormant until March,
1980

when

new

counsel

requested

a

non-jury

trial

and

later

changed the request for a jury trial and the case was set for
October 22, 1981.
The plaintiff

then moved to dismiss the Complaint

under

Rule 41(b) based upon the allegation that nothing significant
had been done for years to move the case along.

The Court,

acting upon the plaintiffs' Motion, dismissed the case pursuant
to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In supporting the Trial Court's Decision, the Supreme Court
noted that Moorely, the plaintiffs' accountant who had custody
of the books and records, had died sometime between the delivery
and the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss.

It was also shown

that the plaintiff had long since gone out of business and its
officers had

lost

any hope of collecting

21

on the defendants1

worthless check and the Court in summarizing the power of the
District Court, stated as follows:
Rule 41(b) sets no deadline for the moving
party to act; indeed, the Court retains
inherent power to dismiss an action for
failure to prosecute pursuant to its own
Motion•
K. L. C.. Inc.. supra at 987.
The Supreme Court ruled on the same issue
Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah, 1980).

in Wilson v.

In that case, the original

Complaint was filed on March 11, 1968.

An Answer was filed on

April 22, 1968 and nothing else transpired until April 26, 1973,
at which time an Order issued from the Court setting the matter
for trial on September 17, 1973.

The trial was continued and no

new date was set until May 4, 1977 when plaintiffs moved to
vacate

the

interest,
approval

trial
which

from

date
they

the

inasmuch
had

Probate

as the

sale

contracted
Court.

to

The

of the property

purchase,

approval

was

required
finally

obtained on May 16, 1977, immediately following which plaintiffs
moved the Court to issue an Order substituting them as party
plaintiffs in the action.

On January

10, 1978, seven months

later, and more than nine years after the original Petition to
Review the Decision of the State Engineer had been filed, the
trial court issued an Order to Show Cause why the matter should
not be dismissed.

Upon hearing of the matter, it was referred to
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the trial calendar.
with plaintiffs 1

first

on October

16,

failure

diligently

to

On October

3, 1978, defendant was

Interrogatories,

1978, defendant

filed

prosecute

the

Two weeks

a Motion
case.

to
The

served

thereafter,
Dismiss

for

trial

court

the

Wilson

granted the Motion.
In

reviewing

the

Decision

of

Judge

Burns

in

case, the Supreme Court noted the great latitude and discretion
given to the trial court with regard to the Rule.

The Supreme

Court stated:
Pursuant to this Rule, it is held, in both
state
and
federal
practice,
that
the
disposition
of a Motion to Dismiss
for
Failure to Prosecute rests with the sound
discretion of the trial court, and that a
showing will not be upset absent a showing
of abuse of that discretion [citing cases].
Wilson, supra at 767.
In

Westincrhouse

Electric

Supply

v.

Paul

W.

Larsen

Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975), the Court listed the
elements to be considered by the trial court as follows:
1) The conduct of both parties:
2)
The opportunity each had to move the
case forward;
3) What each of the parties had done to move the
case forward;
4)
What difficulty or prejudice may have
been caused the other side;
5)
And, most important, whether injustice
may result from the dismissal.
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See also Polk v. Ivers. 561 P.2d
Company

v.

Harris,

565

P. 2d

1075

1135

(Utah 1977); Utah Oil

(Utah

1977);

Grundman

v.

Williams and Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (Utah 1984).
It is respectfully

submitted that the law in this state

interpreting Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
wide latitude to the trial judge.

When one examines the facts

of this case, there is simply no excuse under the criteria set
by this Court to require plaintiffs, after more than ten (10)
years

of

litigation

to

try

a

case

where

all

the

records,

memories, crucial elements in a presentation of a case have been
lost or severely diminished.
In the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the defendants
failed to put on any kind of evidence, showing that a common
thread of records and documents had been kept to allow either
party to prosecute the case.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully
properly

in dismissing

submitted

that the trial

the case and that

it

court acted

is in the best

interest of justice that neither party be put to the burden of
litigating the case.

It was for the purpose of avoiding the
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injustice

presented

in

this

case

that

Rule

41(b)

has

been

employed by the courts.

DATED this

9fl
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